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CHAPTER 7 
Conflict of Laws 
FRANCIS J. NICHOLSON S.J. * 
§ 7 .1. Annulment of Marriage - Decree Entitled to Full Faith and 
Credit. By traditional legal doctrine, a marriage creates a status which, 
viewed as a res, has its situs at the domicile ofthe married parties. Under 
this theory, a divorce action to terminate a status-res is considered an 
action in rem which must be brought at the situs, that is, the domicile. 
If a divorce is granted by a state where at least one of the parties to the 
marriage is domiciled, the decree is valid and entitled to full faith and 
credit everywhere. 1 Jurisdiction to grant annulments has followed an 
analogous, but somewhat different course. An annulment differs concep-
tually from a divorce in that a divor~e terminates a legal status, whereas 
an annulment establishes that a marital status never existed. The absence 
of a valid marriage precludes strict reliance on divorce cases in formu-
lating jurisdictional grounds in annulment actions, for no res or status 
can be found within the state. 2 The courts, however, have recognized a 
state's interest in providing a forum for annulment actions, and state 
practice has evolved a multiple jurisdictional basis which has been en-
dorsed by the Second Restatement. 3 According to section 76 of the 
Restatement (Second), a state has jurisdiction to annul a marriage (a) if 
it would have jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage by divorce or (b) if 
the respondent spouse is subject to the judicial jurisdiction of the state 
and either the marriage was contracted there or the validity of the mar-
riage is determined under its law. As between states of the United States, 
an annulment decree is entitled to full faith and credit. 4 
During the Survey year, in Cavanagh v. Cavanagh,5 the Supreme 
Judicial Court reaffirmed that the judgment of a sister state annulling a 
marriage must be given full faith and credit in Massachusetts.6 The plain-
*FRANCIS J. NICHOLSON, S.J. specializes in the areas of Conflict of Laws and 
International Law in his teaching at Boston College Law School. 
§ 7.1. 1 Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942). 
2 See LEFLAR, McDOUGAL & FELIX, AMERICAN CoNFLICTS LAW § 231 (4th ed. 1986); 
SCOLES & HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS§§ 15.15-15.16 (1982). 
3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS§ 76 (1971). 
4 Sutton v. Leib, 342 U.S. 402 (1952). 
5 396 Mass. 836, 489 N.E.2d 671 (1986). 
6 Id. at 839, 489 N.E.2d at 673. 
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tiff, Robert Cavanagh, brought an action in the Probate Court for Norfolk 
County to annul his marriage to Violet Cavanagh. 7 At the time the com-
plaint was filed, both parties resided in Rhode Island.8 In 1954, while the 
plaintiff was domiciled in Massachusetts, he and the defendant were 
married in Rhode lsland.9 They lived together as husband and wife in 
Massachusetts until 1962, at which time they moved to Rhode lsl~nd. 10 
In 1971, the parties separated. 11 In 1971, the defendant, Violet, filed for 
divorce in a Rhode Island court. Her divorce petition was dismissed on 
the ground that she was not legally married to Robert becaus~ of a prior 
existing valid marriage. 12 The Rhode Island court, refusing to grant Rob-
ert an annulment, entered a decree of divorce ab initio. 13 Robert's com-
plaint in the Massachusetts action had requested an annulment of the 
parties' marriage and an equitable distribution of the parties' property. 14 
The defendant, Violet, moved to dismiss on the ground that the com-
plaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 15 That 
ground, in turn, was based on the claim that the Rhode Island judgment 
had res judicata effect in Massachusetts. 16 The judge of the probate court 
granted the defendant's motion to dismissY The plaintiff appealed to the 
Appeals Court and the case was transferred to the Supreme Judicial 
Court. 18 The Court affirmed the judgment of dismissal. 19 
The Supreme Judicial Court considered the res judicata effect of the 
Rhode Island judgment upon further proceedings between the parties in 
Massachusetts. The Court noted that res judicata is an affirmative defense 
under Massachusetts practice.20 If the complaint shows on its face the 
existence of an affirmative defense, the Court continued, the complaint 
does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and a motion to 
dismiss is appropriate. 21 The Court found that the complaint in Cavanagh 
showed on its face that the Rhode Island court had dismissed the defen-
dant Violet's divorce action and had granted the plaintiff Robert a "di-
7 Id. at 836, 489 N.E.2d at 672. 
8 /d. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 836-37, 489 N.E.2d at 672. 
II Jd. 
12 I d. at 837, 489 N .E.2d at 672. 
13 ld. 
14 ld. 
15 Id. 
16 ld. 
17 ld. 
18 Id. at 836, 489 N.E.2d 672. 
19 ld. 
20 ld. at 838, 489 N.E.2d at 673. See MASS. R. DoM. REL. P. 8(c). 
21 396 Mass. at 838, 489 N.E.2d at 673. See MAss. R. DoM. REL. P. 12(b)(6). 
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vorce ab initio. "22 The Court concluded that the complaint made it clear 
that the Rhode Island co1,1rt had jurisdiction over the subject matter and 
both parties, and that the judgment was final in Rhode Island. 23 
The plaintiff, Robert, argued that the Rhode Island judgment had no 
res judicata effect preventing him from seeking an annulment in Massa-
chusetts.24 He contended that he never had an opportunity to obtain an 
annulment in Rhode Island because Rhode Island did not, by law, grant 
annulments. 25 The Supreme Judicial Court rejected the plaintiff's argu-
ment. The Court held that the language of both the judgment and the 
statute made it clear that the Rhode Island judgment did not terminate a 
valid marriage but rather declared the parties' marriage void. According 
to the Court, the judgment in Rhode Island was the equivalent of an 
annulment under Massachusetts law. 26 It was clear, the Court concluded, 
that regardless of whether the Rhode Island court had annulled or dis-
solved the plaintiff's marriage, the status of the plaintiff's marriage was 
established definitively by that court's adjudicationY 
Article 4, section 1, of the United States Constitution, the full faith 
and credit clause, requires that state courts give to the judgments of sister 
states the same finality that they are accorded in the latter states. 28 The 
full faith and credit requirement extends to state annulment decree&. 29 
The Supreme Judicial Court stated that the Rhode Island court judgment 
had established with finality the status of the plaintiff's marriage. 30 The 
Court held, therefore, that the plaintiff could not relitigate the same 
question in Massachusetts and affirmed dismissal of the complaint. 31 
The Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Cavanagh is correct. The 
22 396 Mass. at 838, 489 N.E.2d at 673. 
23 /d. 
24 /d. 
25 /d. See R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 15-5-1 1981 which provides that "[d]ivorces from the bond 
of marriage shall be decreed in case of any marriage originally void or voidable by law 
26 396 Mass. at 839 n.2, 489 N.E.2d at 673 n.2. See G.L. c. 207, § 14. 
27 396 Mass. at 838-39, 489 N.E.2d at 673. 
28 See Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948). 
29 See Sutton v. Leib, 342 U.S. 402 (1952); Robbins v. Robbins, 343 Mass. 247, 178 
N.E.2d 281 (1961). 
30 396 Mass. at 839, 489 N.E.2d at 673. 
31 /d. The Supreme Judicial Court deemed it appropriate to comment on why the plaintiff 
brought this action. The plaintiff was dissatisfied with the division of the parties' real estate 
ordered by the Rhode Island court in conjunction with the "divorce ab initio," The plain-
tiff's counsel conceded that the Mas.sachusetts suit was initiated in the hope of obtaining 
a more favorable distribution of property. The Court observed that counsel had not ex-
plained why the Rhode Island order relative to the real property would not be accorded 
res judicata effect and, consequently, entitled to full faith and credit in Massachusetts. /d. 
at 839 n.3, 489 N .E.2d at 673-74 n.3. 
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complaint in Cavanagh stated that the plaintiff doubted the validity of 
his marriage to the defendant despite the legal proceedings in Rhode 
Island. 32 The plaintiff sought an annulment in Massachusetts in order to 
clarify the marital status of the parties.33 The plaintiff's misgivings had 
no foundation in law. Both the plaintiff and the defendant were domiciled 
in Rhode Island at the time they brought their case in that state, and the 
proceedings before the Rhode Island court were bilateral. The Rhode 
Island court clearly had the power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over 
the parties and to enter a final judgment nullifying the marriage. 34 
Article 4, section 1, of the United States Constitution mandates that the 
courts of Massachusetts give the same finality to the judgment of the 
Rhode Island court. In this way the full faith and credit clause performs 
its intended function by avoiding relitigation in other states of previously 
adjudicated issues. 
§ 7 .2. Forum Non Conveniens: Massachusetts Cause of Action Dismissed. 
The plaintiff in a transitory cause of action often has a choice of forums 
in which to sue. For example, in Anglo-American law, an individual is 
subject to the jurisdiction of any state where he can be personally served. 1 
Some of these fora may have very little connection with the case either 
because the cause of action sued upon occurred outside the forum state, 
or because neither the plaintiff nor the defendant resides in the state. 
The plaintiff, however, may bring suit in such a forum where he hopes 
to secure a larger award of damages, or where judicial procedure seems 
more favorable to him, or where the inconvenience of defending may 
induce the defendant to enter reluctantly into a settlement. In order to 
protect the defendant in these circumstances, the forum non conveniens 
rule has been adopted by most states whereby a court, in its discretion, 
will refuse to hear a case if it views itself to be a seriously inappropriate 
forum, as long as the plaintiff has a convenient forum elsewhere. 2 
During the Survey year, in Joly v. Albert Larocque Lumber Ltd.,3 the 
Supreme Judicial Court applied the doctrine of forum non conveniens 
and found that Massachusetts did not have sufficient interest to provide 
a forum for this case. The plaintiff Joly, as mother and next friend of her 
two sons, and as administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband, 
brought suit for the wrongful death of her husband, arising from a one-
32 /d. at 837, 489 N.E.2d at 672. 
33 /d. 
34 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) supra note 3, at § 76. 
§ 7.2. 1 See REESE & ROSENBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 46-47 (8th ed. 1984). 
2 See LEFLAR, McDOUGAL & FELIX, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 48 (4th ed. 1986); 
SCOLES & HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS§§ 11.9-11.12 (1982). 
3 397 Mass. 43, 489 N.E.2d 698 (1986). 
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vehicle accident in Massachusetts.4 The husband was killed when a trac-
tor-trailer in which he was a passenger overturned on a Massachusetts 
road. 5 The vehicle was leased to and controlled by the defendant Albert 
Larocque Lumber Ltd. ("Larocque"). There were averments of agency, 
negligence, and reckless conduct against Larocque and the operator.6 
Averments of negligence arising out of the maintenance of the tractor-
trailer were also made against Inter Can Leasing Ltd. ("Inter Can") which 
had leased the vehicle to Larocque.7 All parties to the suit were residents 
of Canada.8 
The plaintiff brought her suit in the Superior Court for Suffolk County 
seeking damages under the death statute and for the decedent's conscious 
pain and suffering.9 The defendant's motion to dismiss on the ground of 
forum non conveniens was allowed by a judge of the superior court. 10 
The plaintiff's request for direct appellate review was granted. 11 The 
Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff's claim by 
the superior court. 12 
In its ruling, the Supreme Judicial Court noted that it infrequently had 
decided cases under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. 13 The Court 
cited its decision in Lydia E. Pinkham Medicine Co. v. Gove 14 in which 
it held that the doctrine was to be used with caution. 15 The Joly Court 
was not concerned with jurisidiction, 16 but noted that whether a suit 
should be entertained or dismissed under the forum non conveniens rule 
depends largely upon the facts of the particular case and is a matter 
within the sound discretion of the judge. 17 The Court subsequently turned 
to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Gulf Oil Corp. v. 
Gilbert18 for a catalogue of the considerations which should guide a judge 
in deciding whether to apply forum non conveniens. 19 Among the con-
siderations which the Supreme Judicial Court listed included the follow-
4 /d. at 43-44, 489 N.E.2d at 699. 
5 ld. 
6 /d. at 44, 489 N.E.2d at 699. 
7 Id. 
8 /d. 
9 /d. at 43-44, 489 N.E.2d at 698-99. 
10 Id. at 43, 489 N.E.2d at 698. 
ll[d. 
12/d. at 45, 489 N.E.2d at 699. 
13 /d. at 44, 489 N.E.2d at 699. 
14 298 Mass. 53, 9 N.E.2d 573 (1937). 
15 Id. at 59, 9 N.E.2d at 576. 
16 397 Mass. at 44, 489 N.E.2d at 699. 
17 Id. See Universal Adjustment Corp. v. Midland Bank, Ltd., 281 Mass. 303, 184 N.E. 
152 (1933). 
18 330 u.s. 501, 508 (1947). 
19 397 Mass. at 44, 489 N.E.2d at 699. 
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ing: (1) access to sources of proof; (2) availability of process to compel 
attendance of unwilling witnesses; (3) the expense of obtaining the pres-
ence of willing witnesses; ( 4) the enforceability of a judgment. 20 
Applying these considerations to the facts in Joly, the Supreme Judicial 
Court concluded that a Canadian forum would be more convenient. 21 All 
the parties resided in Canada, the place where the tractor-trailer origi-
nated and was to return. 22 Many witnesses were residents of Canada.23 
The allege~ negligence of Inter Can occurred in Canada. 24 The vehicle 
was registered and regularly garaged in Canada,25 and finally, Quebec, 
the domicile of the plaintiffs, had a no-fault death statute. 26 
The Supreme Judicial Court acknowledged that Massachusetts had an 
interest in the case with respect to enforcing its traffic laws on roads of 
the Commonwealth. 27 On balance, however, the Court found that the 
factors favoring a trial in Canada far outweighed the interest of Massa-
chusetts as a forum for litigating the case.28 Accordingly, the Court held 
that the superior court judge did not abuse his discretion in granting the 
motions to dismiss. 29 
The Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Joly reaffirms the usefulness 
of the forum non conveniens doctrine as a means of limiting jurisdiction 
in conflict cases. Since the plaintiff is free to choose the place of suit, 
his choice of forum should not be disturbed except for weighty reasons. 30 
Accordingly, as the Court stated, the doctrine should be applied with 
caution.31 When the chosen forum is clearly inappropriate, as in Joly, 
however, the action should be dismissed. 32 If a state chooses to exercise 
the judicial jurisdiction which it possesses despite the fact that it is an 
inappropriate forum, its decision to do so is valid and will be recognized 
by other states under the full faith and credit clause. 33 If, however, the 
chosen forum has no substantial interest in the litigation, legitimate state 
interest dictates that the court dismiss the case. 34 Although Massachu-
20 /d. 
21 /d. 
22Jd. 
23Jd. 
24 /d. at 45, 489 N.E.2d at 699. 
25Jd. 
26Jd. 
27 /d. 
2BJd. 
29Jd. 
30 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS§ 84 comment C (1971). 
31 397 Mass. at 44, 489 N.E.2d at 699. 
32 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) supra note 30, at§ 84 comments c & e. 
33 /d. at § 84 comment g. 
34 See Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947). The United States Supreme 
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setts did possess some interest in the facts and circumstances of Joly, 
this interest did not outweigh the factors enumerated by the Court35 
favoring Canada as a forum and thus, the Court's affirmation of the 
dismissal of the plaintiff's claim was correct. 
§ 7 .3. Workers' Compensation - Massachusetts Law Applied Barring 
Tort Suit Against Fellow Employee. During the Survey year the Appeals 
Court of Massachusetts, in Frassa v. Cauljield, 1 applied the conflict of 
laws rule of Massachusetts in a workers' compensation case to bar a 
wrongful death action brought against a fellow employee of the decedent 
following a New Hampshire accident. 
The plaintiff administratrix's decedent, Frassa, and the defendant, 
Caulfield, were Massachusetts residents and employees of a Massachu-
setts accounting firm assigned to conduct an audit of a private school in 
New Hampshire. 2 Frassa and Caulfield usually conducted audits on 
clients' premises. 3 On June 19, 1978, Frassa and Caulfield traveled to the 
school in Caulfield's car. 4 The employer was required to reimburse Caul-
field for his car mileage and both men for their meal expenses. 5 They 
stayed overnight at the school and were required to take their evening 
meal outside the school's premises.6 On June 22, the audit was not yet 
complete and Frassa and Caulfield drove in Caulfield's car to a restaurant, 
located about one-half hour from the school, for dinner.7 After dinner, 
they drove to two other establishments for entertainment. 8 Approxi-
mately two hours later, on the trip back to the school and at a point 
about a ten minute drive from the school, Caulfield failed to make a tum 
on the road, the car overturned, and Frassa was killed. 9 The plaintiff and 
the defendant were in agreement that Caulfield's negligence was the 
proximate cause of Frassa's death, and as to the amount of money 
damages resulting from Frassa's death. 10 
At the time of the accident, Frassa and Caulfield were covered by 
Court has recently affirmed its approval of the forum non conveniens doctrine in Piper 
Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981). 
35 See supra note 20 and accompanying text for Court's enumeration of factors. 
§ 7.3. '22 Mass. App. Ct. 105, 491 N.E.2d 657 (1986). 
2 Jd. at 106, 491 N.E.2d at 658. 
3 ld. 
4 ld. 
5/d. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 ld. 
9 Jd. 
10 Id. 
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workers' compensation. 11 The plaintiff filed a claim for workers' com-
pensation benefits which the Industrial Accident Board ("Board") de-
niedY Subsequently, the plaintiff and the employer's insurer compro-
mised the claim, and the board approved a $155,500 settlement. 13 The 
agreement expressly provided that it was not an acknowledgement that 
Frassa was acting in the course of his employment at the time of the 
accident. 14 After the original denial of the claim by the Board and before 
the settlement was negotiated, the plaintiff commenced the action in this 
case against Caulfield seeking damages for wrongful death and conscious 
pain and suffering. 15 Upon a request of the parties,l6 the Superior Court 
for Middlesex County heard a motion for summary judgment and reported 
the case to the Appeals Court. The Appeals Court remanded the case to 
the superior court with instructions to enter judgment for the defendant. 17 
The plaintiff in Frassa made two arguments before the Appeals Court. 
The plaintiff argued first that the law of New Hampshire, the place of 
the wrong, should be applied to determine Caulfield's liability. 18 Under 
New Hampshire workers' compensation law at the time of the accident, 
a deceased employee's legal representative was permitted to bring a suit 
against a fellow employee based on common law principles. 19 On the 
other hand, chapter 152 provides that, in Massachusetts, an employee 
injured in the course of his employment by the negligence of a fellow 
employee cannot recover from that fellow employee if he too was acting 
in the course of his employment. 20 Alternatively, the plaintiff contended 
that even if Massachusetts law applied, the plaintiff's suit was not barred 
by the fellow employee rule because neither Frassa nor Caulfield was 
acting in the course of his employment at the time of the accident. 21 
The Appeals Court began its analysis by considering the choice of law 
11 /d. Frassa had not reserved his common law rights. ld. See G.L. c. 152, § 24. 
12 /d. 
13 /d. 
14 /d. at 106-07, 491 N.E.2d at 658. 
15 /d. at 107, 491 N.E.2d at 658. Amendments added the employer's partners as defen-
dants. After the Board approved the settlement agreement, the Superior Court granted 
summary judgment as to the partners. /d. at 107 n.1, 491 N.E.2d at 658 n.l. 
16 /d. at 105, 491 N.E.2d at 657. 
17 /d. at 113, 491 N .E.2d at 662. 
18 /d. at 107, 491 N.E.2d at 658. 
19 /d. See La Bounty v. American Ins. Co., 122 N.H. 738, 451 A.2d 161 (1982). Amended 
New Hampshire law prohibiting actions against fellow employees except for intentional 
torts became effective four days after Frassa's death. /d. at 107 n.2, 491 N.E.2d at 658 
n.2. 
20 /d. at 107, 491 N.E.2d at 658. See Saharceski v. Marcure, 373 Mass. 304, 366 N.E.2d 
1245 (1977). 
21 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 107, 491 N.E.2d at 659. 
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problem raised by the plaintiff's first argument. The court stated that the 
decision of the Supreme Judicial Court in Saharceski v. Marcure22 was 
determinative of which state's law applied when deciding whether the 
plaintiff's action could be maintained. 23 In Saharceski, the plaintiff and 
the defendant were residents of Massachusetts and employees of a Mas-
sachusetts corporation. 24 The plaintiff and the defendant traveled by 
motor vehicle for their employer's business from Massachusetts into 
Connecticut intending to pass through that state without stopping. 25 The 
defendant was driving the vehicle when he negligently struck another car 
in Connecticut. 26 Both parties were covered by workers' compensation 
insurance under chapter 152 and the plaintiff, who sustained injuries in 
the accident, collected compensation from the company's insurance car-
rier.27 Under the law of Connecticut, the plaintiff would also be entitled 
to recover from the defendant. 28 The Supreme Judicial Court concluded 
that the substantive law of Massachusetts applied, thus barring recovery 
under the fellow employee rule.29 The Court, in deciding that Massachu-
setts law governed, stated that the application of the law of the state of 
common employment provided both a certain basis for the resolution of 
the issue and assurance that the maintenance of a tort suit would not 
depend solely on the fortuitous place of the accident. 30 
The Appeals Court found that Frassa was similar to Saharceski on the 
facts. 31 As in Saharceski, the court stated, all of the significant contacts 
of Frassa and Caulfield were in Massachusetts, including the collection 
of substantial workers' compensation benefits under Massachusetts law. 32 
In addition, the court continued, Frassa and Caulfield were in New 
Hampshire for only a few days. 33 Finally, the court rejected the plaintiff's 
argument that New Hampshire had a greater interest than Massachusetts 
because of highway safety concerns arising from Frassa's death on a 
New Hampshire road. 34 In sum, the court concluded, New Hampshire's 
22 373 Mass. 304, 366 N.E.2d 1245 (1977). See Nicholson, Conflict of Laws, 1982 ANN. 
SURV. MASS. LAW § 7.5, at 265-68. 
23 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 107, 491 N.E.2d at 659. 
24 373 Mass. at 305, 366 N.E.2d at 1246. 
25 ld. 
26 Id. at 305-06, 366 N.E.2d at 1246. 
27 ld. 
28 Id. at 305, 366 N.E.2d at 1246. 
29 Id. at 311-12, 366 N.E.2d at 1249. 
30 Id. at 310-12, 366 N.E.2d at 1249. 
31 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 108, 491 N.E.2d at 659. 
32 Id. 
33 ld. 
34 ld. 
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transient interest in the circumstances of Frassa was insignificant in 
relation to the established employment relationship of Frassa, the defen-
dant Caulfield, and their employer under Massachusetts law. 35 
The Appeals Court then turned to the status question raised by the 
plaintiff's second argument. Were Frassa and Caulfield, the court asked, 
acting in the course of their employment at the time of the car accident 
which caused Frassa's death?36 If so, the court stated, the plaintiff was 
barred from recovery against Caulfield under the fellow employee rule.37 
The court noted that general principles with respect to determining em-
ployment status were well established,38 and cited the following criteria 
from the Supreme Judicial Court decision in Papanastassiou' s Case: 39 
"An injury arises out of the employment if it arises out of the nature, 
conditions, obligations or incidents of the employment, in other words, 
out of the employment looked at in any of its aspects. "40 Applying the 
Papanastassiou test to the facts in Frassa, the Appeals Court held that 
"there is no question that during reasonable travel to and from the evening 
meal on the night of the accident, travel clearly impelled by the nature 
and conditions of the employment, Frassa and Caulfield were acting in 
the course of their employment. "41 The court ruled that the plaintiff was, 
therefore, barred by the fellow employee rule from maintaining her action 
against the defendant Caulfield. 42 
The Appeals Court's resolution ofthe choice oflaw question in Frassa 
follows the approach taken in workers' compensation cases.43 Workers' 
compensation statutes were designed to provide a quick and certain 
remedy for employees who sustain work injuries by statutorily imposing 
absolute but limited and determinate liability upon the employer, includ-
ing immunity from common law tort suits.44 Many states extend immunity 
from tort suits to third-party tortfeasors like fellow employees.45 These 
laws represent a compromise that inures to the benefit of both employer 
35 Id. at 109, 491 N.E.2d at 659. 
36 Id. at 109, 491 N.E.2d at 660. 
37 ld. Saharceski v. Marcure, 373 Mass. 304, 305, 366 N.E.2d 1245, 1246 (1977). 
38 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 109, 491 N.E.2d at 660. 
39 362 Mass. 91, 284 N.E.2d.598 (1972). 
40 Id. at 93-94, 284 N.E.2d at 600. 
41 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 110, 491 N .E.2d at 660. The court also held that the visits Frassa 
and Caulfield made to the two places of entertainment on the evening of the accident were 
reasonably to be expected of employees away from home and were incidental to their 
employment. Id. at 110-11, 491 N.E.2d at 660-61. 
42 Id. at 113, 491 N.E.2d at 662. 
43 See, e.g., Wilson v. Faull, 27 N.J. 105, 141 A.2d 768 (1958). 
44 See LEFLAR, McDOUGAL & FELIX, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW§§ 160, 163 (4th ed. 
1986); SCOLES & HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS§§ 17.45, 17.47 (1982). 
45 ld. 
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and employee. Social justice necessitates such a quid pro quo arrange-
ment in our industrial world. It is logical, therefore, to choose the com-
pensation law of the state with the substantial connection to the employ-
ment relationship. As the Appeals Court's analysis clearly indicates, only 
Massachusetts had a significant interest in the rights of the parties in 
Frassa. The Frassa opinion tracks the decision of the Supreme Judicial 
Court in Saharceski and further evidences the conflicts law of Massa-
chusetts applied in workers' compensation cases. 
§ 7 .4. Statute of Limitations - Borrowing Statute Bars Cause of Action. 
Historically, statutes of limitations were considered as procedural in 
conflict of laws cases. Hence, forum statutes of limitations usually ap-
plied. 1 This was true whether the forum statute to which the action was 
connected was shorter or longer than that of another state. 2 This approach 
to limitation statutes obviously promoted forum shopping as plaintiffs 
and their attorneys looked for the jurisdiction related to the cause of 
action having the longer limitation period.3 Concern for the forum-shop-
ping problem has led to a statutory exception to the general approach, 
the borrowing statute. 4 As a general proposition, the borrowing statute 
requires the forum to apply or "borrow" the shorter limitation statute of 
another state with the result that an action cannot bet maintained if it is 
barred by the statute of limitations of that other state.5 The borrowing 
statutes do not all use the same criteria to identify the other state. Some 
refer to the state where the cause of action "arose" or "accrued" or to 
the state in which the plaintiff and/or the defendant were domiciled during 
a period subsequent to the transaction on which the claim is based.6 
During the Survey year, the Appeals Court of Massachusetts applied the 
Massachusetts borrowing statute in Wilcox v. Riverside Park Enterprises, 
Inc.,7 to bar a suit brought by Connecticut plaintiffs. 
The plaintiffs, Wilcox, a minor and his parents, were residents of 
Connecticut.8 In their complaint, filed on November 21, 1984, they al-
leged that on July 22, 1982, the minor plaintiff sustained injuries while 
riding a "rocket ship" at an amusement park operated negligently by the 
defendant, Riverside Park Enterprises, Inc., ("Riverside"), a Massachu-
§ 7.4. 1 See LEFLAR, MCDOUGAL & FELIX, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW§ 127 (4th ed. 
1986). 
2 /d. 
3 /d. 
4 /d. at § 128. Some thirty-five states have enacted borrowing statutes of various kinds. 
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS§ 142 comment b (rev. ed. 1986). 
5 See SCOLES & HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS§ 3.11 (1982). 
6 /d. 
7 21 Mass. App. Ct. 419, 487 N.E.2d 860 (1986). 
8 /d. at 420, 487 N.E.2d at 861. 
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setts corporation.9 The park was located in Agawam, Massachusetts, 
three miles from the Connecticut border. 10 An affidavit submitted by the 
defendant stated that an estimated one-half million Connecticut residents 
visited the park in 1982, and that the defendant, in that year, spent more 
than half of its advertising budget in Connecticut. 11 The Superior Court 
for Hampden County, on the defendant's motion to dismiss the corn-
plaint, entered summary judgment for the defendant. 12 The plaintiffs 
appealed and the Appeals Court, holding that the Massachusetts borrow-
ing statute barred the cause of action, affirrned. 13 
The Appeals Court noted that the seldorn-used14 Massachusetts bor-
rowing statute was the basis for the defendant Riverside's claim that the 
plaintiffs' personal injury action was tirne-barred. 15 The statute provides, 
in relevant part, as follows: "[N]o action shall be brought by any person 
upon a cause of action which was barred by the laws of any state or 
country while he resided therein. "16 According to the court, this clause 
bars a nonresident plaintiff from suing in Massachusetts on a cause of 
action barred by the laws of the state in which the plaintiff resides. 
The court observed that, apart from the borrowing statute, Massachu-
setts would apply its own three-year statute of limitations, and the suit 
would not be barred. 17 Massachusetts followed the traditional view that 
statutes of limitations are procedural rules requiring the application of 
the law of the forum. 18 Because a state following the traditional view 
considers its borrowing statute as part of its statute of lirnitations,19 the 
court continued, it would seem that the Massachusetts borrowing statute 
required the application of Connecticut law. 20 The court noted that Con-
necticut had a two-year statute of limitations for suits for personal injuries 
caused by negligence. 21 If an action were brought in Connecticut on a 
claim for personal injuries sustained in another state, the court continued, 
a Connecticut court would apply its own two-year statute of limitations 
9 Id. 
10 Jd. at 421, 487 N.E.2d at 861. 
11 Id. at 420, 487 N.E.2d at 861. 
12 ld. at 420-21, 487 N.E.2d at 861. 
13 /d. at 419, 487 N.E.2d at 860. 
14 ld. 
15 ld. 
16 G.L. c. 260, § 9. 
17 21 Mass. App. Ct. at 421, 487 N.E.2d at 861. 
18 ld. See Clarke v. Pierce, 215 Mass. 552, 102 N.E. 1094 (1913); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 142 (1971). 
19 21 Mass. App. Ct. at 421, 487 N.E.2d at 861. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoN-
FLICT OF LAWS § 142(1) (1971). 
20 21 Mass. App. Ct. at 421,487 N.E.2d at 861. 
21 ld. 
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as a procedural rule. 22 Therefore, the court concluded, if the plaintiffs in 
Wilcox had brought suit in Connecticut more than two years after the 
accident in Massachusetts, Connecticut law would have barred their 
recovery. 23 Because Connecticut, the domicile of the plaintiffs, would 
have barred their suit, the Massachusetts borrowing statute, if applicable, 
would certainly bar recovery by the plaintiffs in Massachusetts. 24 
The Appeals Court considered the plaintiffs' argument that the Mas-
sachusetts borrowing statute did not apply in Wilcox because a Con-
necticut court would not have had jurisdiction over the defendant. 25 
Nevertheless, the court found that Connecticut could have exercised 
jurisdiction over the defendant Riverside.26 Therefore, the court declined 
to consider the question whether the Massachusetts borrowing statute 
would apply in a case in which the state of a plaintiff's residence did not 
have jurisdiction over a defendantY The court found that the "minimum 
contacts" test was met by Riverside's active solicitation of Connecticut 
residents to patronize its amusement park three miles from the Connect-
icut border. 28 The court stated correctly that Connecticut could have 
subjected the defendant to its jurisdiction in compliance with the require-
ments of due process. 29 
The Appeals Court noted that the plaintiffs also raised the question 
whether the borrowing statute applied to a cause of action arising in 
Massachusetts, since both the allegedly tortious conduct and the resulting 
injuries occurred in the Commonwealth. 30 The court conceded that the 
plaintiffs' argument on this point had some logical appeal. 31 Because 
Massachusetts was the state most directly concerned with the defendant 
Riverside's activity, the court observed, Massachusetts was the state 
whose laws, including the statute of limitations, most appropriately ap-
plied. 32 The court also noted that the borrowing statutes of most states 
provide that the controlling statute of limitations is that of the state where 
the cause of action arose. 33 The court, however, refused to accept the 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 421-22, 487 N.E.2d at 861. 
24 See G.L. c. 260, § 9: "[N]o action shall be brought by any person upon a cause of 
action ... barred by the laws of any state ... while he resided therein." 
2
' 21 Mass. App. Ct. at 422, 487 N.E.2d at 861. 
26 ld. 
27 ld. 
28 I d. at 422, 487 N .E.2d at 862. 
29 Id. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980); 
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
30 21 Mass. App. Ct. at 423, 487 N.E.2d at 862. 
31 Id. 
32 ld. 
33 Id. See Ester, Borrowing Statutes of Limitation and Conflict of Laws, 15 Fla. L. Rev. 
33, 79-84 (1962), the authoritative article on borrowing statutes in conflict of laws. 
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interpretation of the borrowing statute advanced by the plaintiffs. 34 Since 
1880, when the borrowing statute was enacted, the court pointed out that 
the Massachusetts legislature has consistently rejected a version which 
referred to the state or country where the cause of action accrued. 35 The 
court held that "we must accept the Massachusetts statute for what it is: 
the only borrowing statute that makes the law of the State of the plain-
tiff's residence the determinative factor. "36 
The Appeals Court found a justification for the unique Massachusetts 
borrowing statute: the avoidance of forum shoppingY According to the 
court, the Massachusetts statute prevented the Connecticut plaintiffs 
from receiving a benefit via a suit in Massachusetts that they could not 
have received in their home state where their cause of action was 
barred.38 The court also found it appropriate that Connecticut's law was 
applied through the borrowing statute. 39 Connecticut was the state of the 
plaintiff's residence and the jurisdiction in which the infant plaintiff was 
experiencing his disabilities.40 It was altogether proper that Connecticut, 
as parens patriae, have its law applied to the cause of action.41 Finally, 
the court observed pointedly, the plaintiffs had two years to file a timely 
action in the courts of either Connecticut or Massachusetts.42 Following 
this analysis, the Appeals Court affirmed the judgment of the~ superior 
court for the defendant, Riverside.43 
The decision of the Appeals Court in Wilcox is a welcome affirmation 
of the continued viability of the borrowing statute in Massachusetts 
conflicts law. As the court indicated, the Massachusetts borrowing statute 
has notbeen used very much in recent years. 44 Yet the borrowing statute 
remains a prominent topic in the law of conflicts and appears regularly 
in the choice of law decisions of many courts in other jurisdictions. 45 The 
Wilcox decision indicates that the borrowing statute is alive and well in 
Massachusetts. 
One further comment should be made with respect to the status of the 
statute of limitations in conflicts law. The Appeals Court in Wilcox noted 
34 21 Mass. App. Ct. at 423, 487 N.E.2d at 862. 
35 Id. at 423-24 and n.4, 487 N.E.2d at 862 and n.4. 
36 /d. at 424 and n.5, 487 N.E.2d at 863 and n.5. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONFLICT OF LAWS§ 142 comment b (rev. ed. 1986). 
37 21 Mass. App. Ct. at 425, 487 N.E.2d at 863. 
38 ld. 
39Jd . 
.., ld. 
41 ld. 
42Jd. 
43 ld. 
44 Jd. at 419, 487 N.E.2d at 860. 
45 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 142(1) (rev. ed. 1986). 
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that section 2 of the 1982 Uniform Conflict of Laws Limitation Act, 
proposes to make applicable the statute of limitations of the state whose 
law governs other substantive issues inherent in the cause of action. 46 
The court stated that two states, not including Massachusetts, had 
adopted this positionY The Appeals Court's observation evidences the 
change which is beginning to take place in the characterization of statutes 
of limitations, including borrowing statutes - the shift from the tradi-
tional procedural to the substantive classification. 48 In a number of recent 
conflicts decisions, with the courts of New Jersey leading the way,49 
courts have rejected the automatic application of forum law via a pro-
cedural characterization in favor of a substantive characterization. These 
cases take the position that an action will not be maintained if it is barred 
by the statute of limitations of the state which, with respect to that issue, 
is the state of most significant relationships. 5° This new approach seems 
more logical. The statute of limitations, with its borrowing statute pro-
vision, clearly touches in a substantive way the rights and liabilities of 
the parties to a cause of action and the interests of the state with which 
the parties are connectedY It will be interesting to see if and when 
Massachusetts adopts this emerging trend in conflict of laws with respect 
to the statute of limitations. 
46 21 Mass. App. Ct. at 424-25, 487 N.E.2d at 863. 
47 21 Mass. App. Ct. at 425, 487 N .E.2d at 863. 
48 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS§ 142 (rev. ed. 1986); REESE & 
ROSENBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 433-34 (8th ed. 1984). 
49 See Heavner v. Uniroyal Inc., 63 N.J. 130, 305 A.2d 412 (1973). 
50 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS§ 142 comment g (rev. ed. 1986). 
5I ld. 
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